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Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
Address before the American Enterprise Institute
upon receiving the Freedom Award
Washington D.C. 1 May 2001
It is a privilege to be here with you today and to receive this most prestigious reward. As you said all those nice things about me I recalled the response by the former US President Lyndon Johnson to some equally kind words of introduction. Like him, I regret that my parents were not present to hear those words: my father would have enjoyed them and my mother would have believed them. Indeed, I suspect that her tears of pride—national as well as maternal—would have caused the Potomac to flood its banks!
Given the history of my country during the latter 20th century the opportunity to travel abroad to receive a prize—not just any prize but prize awarded for the enhancement of human liberty—is an unusual pleasure, one for which I am deeply grateful. In Hungary we have not grown so accustomed to the enjoyment of our freedom that we yet take it for granted; nor have we grown blasé about its charms. Its systematic and often brutal suppression is too fresh in our recollections for that to occur.
As some of you may know I come here almost directly from my first meeting with your new president. You will be aware that two presidents that played an active role in restoring freedom to Central Europe, Ronald Reagan and George Bush. Both followed policies that were successful in undermining the Soviet empire and in bringing about the victory of freedom. It was their policies that made it possible for us to play our part in regaining our national sovereignties. As a result of meeting with his son earlier today I particularly recall that when George Bush visited Hungary in 1989 he insisted on meeting the with the then opposition leaders. This was far more than a gesture or symbol, although symbols can, of course, be important in politics. At that time—a crucial moment in our history—we were engaged in intensive negotiations with the communists about future elections. Our conversation with President Bush encouraged us to remain uncompromising in our struggle for full and free elections. His visit was therefore well timed, for at that stage it was not clear whether the political profiles of the new Europe would be determined by communist elites, however cleverly these might disguise themselves, or by those of us who were seeking to create genuinely free and democratic societies based on the market economy and the rule of law. President Bush played a crucial role in ensuring victory went to the latter, and therefore deserves this marvellous award quite as much as I. By the way, President George W. Bush continues in this same tradition. I congratulate the American President on the visionary address he gave today, in which he advocated a ballistic missile defense system that, once developed and deployed, will make not only America, but also her allies safer and more secure in the years ahead.
Now to my topic.
Today, I would like touch upon three issues, all of which are outcomes in one way or another of the victory of freedom in Europe. (1) The success story of Central Europe (I was told Americans like success stories and I can report that Hungarians are beginning to share their enthusiasm) (2) Relations between the EU and the US (3) Relations between Central Europe and Russia.
The Success Story of Central Europe
Since 1990, the pattern of economic development has surprised analysts throughout the world. A common assumption was that the former "captive nations" would develop in a similar way once the communist yoke had been lifted. After all, the same power machine operated in all of our countries for forty years. So we all began from a similar starting position. That was the position a decade ago, yet there now are most profound differences among the countries of Central East Europe. Some finished their transition some time ago and some have not even started down that road; but there are differences—economic, political, social, and cultural - between those who have completed that process. I cannot give any explanation for these striking differences and divergence other than to conclude that history does matter.
Despite these divergences (perhaps in some ways because of them) the result is a distinct "belt" of rapid growth and prosperity on the rim of the current European Union composed of the countries we tend to refer to as Central Europe. These countries launched a strategic cooperation in the form of the Visegrad Four and they were the ones to initiate and set up the Central European Free Trade Agreement, CEFTA. The first round of new members of the North Atlantic Alliance come from among them (and so will the second) They also head the list of EU entrants.
In this diverse and dynamic region stretching from the Baltic Sea down to the Adriatic Sea, inflation has been pushed down, unemployment reduced, exports increased significantly, and important infrastructural investments launched. These are "the young democracies"—young not only in the sense that the political arrangements in these countries are new, but also in the sense that a new generation is taking charge. You see before you a prime minister who is 38 years old. It is no exaggeration to say that a majority of key positions in Hungary are now held by young people. A new generation has come to hold decisive positions in business, academia as well as politics and we are full of ideas, plans, energy. Our economy is booming, it produces an annual growth of 5-6%. New construction is taking place in every town: there are entire rows of new family houses as well as new streets, even in small villages. Economic progress has not been at the expense of cultural life or the development of civil society. In the arts there has been an explosion of creativity. In Budapest, for instance, we have started to build the new National Theater, a National Congress Center, The National Philharmonic Concert Hall, a Museum of 20th century Hungarian Art, and a Center of Hungarian Arts and Tradition.
We have launched engineering major projects in Central Europe. This coming fall shall we open a new bridge between Hungary and Slovakia (the last bridge awaiting reconstruction since demolition in World War Two). We have opened two new border stations between Hungary and Romania, we are about to finish a new railway line between Hungary and Slovenia (the first railway construction since 1942!). In addition we planning a highway with Croatia, and another one with Romania, and now that Milosevic is out of the way we have started to negotiate with Yugoslavia on cleaning the Danube.
All in all, I believe that today Central Europe may be the most exciting and dynamic region in the world. Certainly, its success provides remarkable testimony to Ronald Reagan’s conviction that while it is to be cherished for its own sake freedom leads to prosperity.
It would be nice to lean back in our chairs and relax. But there’s much still to do. NATO’s next summit will take place in Prague in 2002. If we truly believe in a Europe "Whole and Free," then let’s not delay in admitting new members to the Alliance. There are new important allies—from the Baltics to the Balkans—working hard, doing their homework, and waiting outside our door. It’s time to move forward and let them in.
Henry Kissinger was surely right to say that the solution each of each problem opens the door to a new problem. Let me deal briefly with some of the most important we face in the alliance today.
Relations between the EU and the U.S.
In Hungary the debate over ESDI is followed with great interest. Although my country is a member of the Alliance and a future EU-member my remarks reflect a fundamentally Hungarian perspective.
First, the cohesion and integrity of NATO is not only more important and more precious to us than any other consideration, and our priorities in this regard are most unlikely to change For only an effective, credible, cohesive strategic alliance can respond to national and regional needs. Thus any reform, modernization, or adaptation to the post-Cold War reality must make sense in security terms if it does not undermine the fundamental value of the Alliance. Otherwise the best constructed proposals, ideas, and reforms are going to be counterproductive. Duplications tend not to increase but to reduce efficiency and thus should be very carefully studied before even proposed, however desirable they may seem to some on political grounds.
Second, we need to acknowledge that the whole ESDI-debate takes place a fundamentally new framework. Yet, curiously, one has an odd sense of déjá-vu when listening to the current debate for it recalls arguments and counter arguments raised in the 70s and then again in the 80s. It seems that every decade has its ESDI-debate. Contemporary debate on this issue is different for two reasons:
First, the economic integration of the EU member countries has reached a stage at which it is possible to contemplate military industrial integration. The Eurofighter is one example of this, but the point is that there can be a common defense industry in Europe, if we so choose.
Two, EU’s political cooperation has increased over time while Moscow has been weakened fundamentally. This has persuaded some EU members that the continent’s security can now be maintained and managed without the American presence. The real question in is how we imagine the relationship of the two continents in the future, an issue that threatens to boil down to one simply either-or question: competition or cooperation, no more Trans-Atlantic link or continued American presence.
From a Central European perspective, there can be only one answer: for us, it is vital to uphold the Trans-Atlantic alliance in Europe. All our historic experience, as well as our geostrategic position points to this one direction.
But I believe the stakes are not only high for the Central Europeans. If we allow our community of values that has been at the heart of the North Atlantic Alliance since the beginning, to slowly evaporate, we shall allow at the same time other value-systems to fill the vacuum. Since the inception of NATO other cultures have exerted an influence. Yet a fundamental community of values continues to exist between our two continents. And it is stronger among us than among any other two actors in the world.
I understand some of the hesitance about the real value for the future in the Trans-Atlantic link. Even today, we refer to the Alliance primarily as a strategic, military alliance, as if we forgotten the factor that made it possible to create it: our values. These values have proven to be of such enduring power and magnetism that not only did they bring victory in the Cold War, but they were able to take fresh root in territories lost to the enemy—think of Central Europe.
I believe the developments of the past ten years offer us a unique chance to determine our shared destiny. It is our historic opportunity to explore those other dimensions/channels that can complement the strategic dimension of the Trans-Atlantic connection and make it stronger. I strongly support every initiative that promotes cooperation on the two sides of the Atlantic, in all fields.
For I believe there is not just one, but four dimensions of the Trans-Atlantic link, three of which still need be explored.
1. The strategic-
2. The political-
3. The economic-
4. and the citizens’ dimension.
I do not have time to exploring each of these dimensions. My approach to all of these is to apply the same alliance logic, the logic of cooperation, in developing each.
I suspect that it is the economic dimension that creates the most anxiety in this room. The EU has gone a long way on deepening its economic integration, and with a very good result. The US has also made serious steps in broadening its free-trade connections in its immediate neighborhood, and these developments are also welcome. But I believe now is the time to start thinking about the relations between our two free-trade zones / integration-frameworks. I lack sufficient powers prophecy sufficient to determine say what this could mean exactly, but until we get there, there is a simple guiding principle that I propose to recommend, representing as it does an approximate reversal of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Perhaps to be known as Orbán’s principle for avoiding unnecessary disagreements between Europe and America, it may be simply stated: do not do to others that you would not like to be done to you. If consistently applied I believe it will reduce the collateral damage resulting from a number of current differences between our two continents.
Now, if you would allow me, I would like to go into slightly more detail in relation to my approach to what I have termed the fourth dimension, that of citizens generally, for this matter is close to my heart.
One of the problems that European leaders have been struggling for some time is how to develop the idea of togetherness. The lack of common feeling or sentiment is closely associated with of what is sometimes referred to as the European democratic deficit. The danger is that the European integration loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the people if they do not feel it on their "skin," as we say in Hungarian. Some of the latest troubles among members of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance have at similar root, deep down, or so it seems to me. Do our peoples still see what it is about? Do they still feel the need for it?
As I landed just some twenty hours ago, I wondered, as I have a few times before, why we still have this rather cruel system in entering in each other’s lands. If we come here, there are two lanes to chose from: US-citizens, non-US citizens. If you come to Europe, you have two lanes to chose from: EU-citizens, non-EU citizens. Why do we not establish a third lane, called "Trans-Atlantic-citizens"? For us, it does and it should feel different, to know that a citizen of our Allies enters our country. It would not be that difficult to give it a tangible, positive sign, the idea I have just thrown at you is just one, but we can think up many innovative forms and structures that give meaning to our shared inheritance of ideas and values.
All these are very exciting questions and we do have to start tackling them, but, for us Central Europeans, they are things to start thinking of, but have no immediacy. What issues are of immediacy?
Central Europe and Russia
The issue of relations between Central Europe and Russia is one which requires immediate attention, and one which inevitably leads to a discussion about recent developments in the Ukraine. I suspect that we can all agree that the independence of the Ukraine is crucial to European security in the post–Cold War era. Developments in Ukraine in the past year have been strongly criticized by many in the West, but I have to tell you that I have a different take on what has been going on there. I believe that those developments were leading toward the establishment of a political structure that is very much along the lines of our own thinking. Previously, the system was practically incomprehensible to a European. The president, the government, and the parliament had all their own ways of managing the country according to their individual interests and those of the power-groups to which they belonged, with very little coordination and even less structure.
After the changes, what we could see was a president that was supported by his government, and a parliament where the majority supported the government, that is a structure that we could at least we understand. What is under way now is the holding back, and possibly the reversal of all of this.
The only way to contradict the drifting of Ukraine towards Russia is to tie it to the Trans-Atlantic world, through the encouragement of a gradual but noticeable increase of living standards. This is a challenge that is beyond the capability of any one country, however big. But together the Trans-Atlantic community could create the necessary political and economic instruments to work out effective policies.
A few words on Russia: we in Central Europe have started to experience a peculiar situation, a new quality of relations with Russia. After the end of the first decade following implosion of the Soviet empire, we can state that the period of chaos is over. Russia does have a picture of itself, of its neighborhood, of Europe and of the world. The Russian presence in Central Europe is a clear indication of their strategy: they now want to establish an economic presence in Central Europe, and it is through the economic means that they wish to uphold an influence there.
Soldiers and tanks are noisy things, and they are relatively easy to track down. Financial movements are very different. Moreover, no government that believes in free markets can make a distinction between capital purely on the basis of its national origins. We in Hungary shall continue to insist on the transparency of these capital movements, so that there can be no suspicion of organized crime, money laundering or hidden purchase of influence there. That is a very necessary condition for establishing prudent relations with Russia.
Ladies and Gentlemen, have I not said more than I should have already? I will therefore close. If there is to be a renewal of Trans-Atlantic ties dialogue and discussion are at least as important as speeches. Thank you for your patience.
nem tudósitott Orbán Viktor amerikai utjáról.
