Irániak szerint ma szétszereltek kb. húsz F35I-t beton fedezékestől, aztán vagy igaz vagy nem. Tulajdonképpen van-e értelme a harci repülőgépeknek, ha a BM mindent visz?
itt azert adagolhatta a kakaot a pilota. mire meglatjuk az utanegeto langjat, addig szerintem nem ket lityko keritesszaggato ugrott be a hajtomube. nyilvan, normalis felszallasnal ezt nem latjuk. amugy tok jo a felvetel.
Harácászati konfigban egy F-16 és SH/H csúcssebessége nem tér el lényegese, a gyorsulásuk már igen. (Hornet repteljesítménye ismert és az F-16-é FPM diagramokból.)
Az egyhajtóműves F-16 statja alig rosszabb, mint az F-15-és a balesetek nagy része nem hajtóműfüggő. (Erre forrás is van az írás megfelelő részén.)
A CAS közben rohadtul nem átesési sebesség közelében repül egy repülőgép még COIN környezetben sem, nemhogy IADS ellen... A mai CAS a GAU-8 gépágyúzgatást - igen ritka - leszámíva 4-5 km magasból PGM dobálás. Soha nem volt a CAS kis sebességű repülés szuperszonikus géppel. Soha. Még Skyraider sem csinált ilyen hülyeséget.
F/A-18. Az egyetlen problémám vele a sebessége, még az E/F változatoknál is. De összességében véve, szóval nem pl. manőverező légiharcra kiélezve, a Hornetet tartom a legjobbnak az adott generációból. Ha leáll egy hajtóműve, akkor is tovább repül, és ami képes anyahajóról operálni, az garantáltan masszív egy dög. Úgy meg lehet terhelni, hogy ihajj, de ha kell, pillanatok alatt átáll légifölény-vadászgéppé. Nálam a 16-os és a Gripen kiesnek az egyetlen hajtómű miatt, a MiG-29-es pedig, bár kiváló vadászgép, de földi csapatok támogatására kevésbé alkalmas. Nem vagyok szakértő aerodinamikai téren, de ránézésre a kialakítása jóval magasabb átesési sebességet sugall, vagyis kevésbé tud lelassulni a földi csapatok aktív, közvetlen támogatásához, illetve nem tűnik túlzottan sérülésállónak.
Itt van, amit eddig is sejtettünk. Az F-35ös folyamatosan küldi az adatokat vissza gyárnak. Köztük a norvég pilóta ájfonjának a tartalmát is. Innen csak egy lépés, hogy központilag kikapcsoljanak rajta ezt-azt, ha nem a jó irányba célzol vele.
nem MiG-29, de: a jól ismert IL-96 300PU mai is járt Budapesten, tök véletlenül akadtam rá a Flightradaron amikor már a dél-lengyel légtérben volt, Dunakeszi felől közelített, aztán lekapcsolta a jeladót. RSD31 jel alatt volt látható. Olyan 8:30 körül volt a Liszt Ferenc környékén. Most néztem, már Minszk mellett halad valszeg Vnukovo felé.
Vajon mit csinált itt? Vagy itt maradt valami tegnapról?
Ha valaki az összeset átolvasta, akkor annak az alábbi gondolataimat/kérdéseimet fogalmaznám meg...
1, Az AWACS által létesített elméleti légi helyzetkép, meglehetősen törékeny a valóságban (néha látták a célt, néha nem, néha simán hamis célokra riasztottak, stb…), pedig itt az AWACS-ok bőven a jelenlegi modern és már világszerte elterjedt area denial SAM HMZ-jén belül repültek, és a Szerbek egyáltalán nem folytattak támadó elektronikai harcot. Szóval a valóságban az AWACS képessége Európai terep fölött jóval korlátozottabb/árnyaltabb mint eddig gondoltam.
2, A 60-as években elképzelt “felesleges a gépágyú, mert a rakéták mindent megoldanak” ideje ~40 év késéssel ugyan, de 1999-re az AMRAAM-al elérkezett.
3, A fenti következménye, hogy az “igazi” közeli fordulós légiharcok elmaradtak, minden pilóta beszámolójában érezhető hogy szinte szégyellik is magukat miatta. Vajon egy AMRAAM-ot hordozó drón is ugyanígy képes lett volna ezekre a győzelmekre?
4, Minden légiharcban megvolt a NATO létszámbeli fölény. Kérdés hogy a minden gépünket tegyünk fel egy lapra (bevetésre), vagy a lassan de biztosan küldjük fel őket az így garantált túlerővel szemben (amit a Szerbek választottak) a jó taktika? Az hogy a keleti MiG-29 technikának egy jó előre ismert kezdetű háború első napjára is a harmada repképtelen, számunkra ugyan nem meglepő, de nagyon komoly kérdéseket vet fel az egész fenntartásának értelmével szemben.
5, Minden amcsi vadász aktívan használta az NCTR-t (ID mátrix-ként hivatkoznak rá), a debrief-ekből elég jól látható viszonylag rövid effektív hatótávolsága (MiG-29-el szemben). Az ellenséges cél sikeres azonosítása mindig bőven már az akkori AMRAAM maximális hatótávolságán belül történt. Van-e egyáltalán értelme gyakorlatban a nagyobb hatótávolságú légiharc rakétáknak, ha a valóságban még harci helyzetben sem indíthatók a cél azonosításának problémája miatt? (lásd ASRAAM)
Maj Peter "Wobble" Tankink (Royal Netherlands Air Force - RNLAF)
No. 322 Squadron “niet praten maar doen” (don't talk but do), F-16AM Operation ALLIED FORCE MiG-29 24 March 1999
The pilot has given two interviews about this event, however he doesn't wish to spend any more time talking about it, he takes the opinion that he was just doing his job and the RNLAF fully supports this typical Dutch no-nonsense attitude.
We had been in several tense situations since the autumn of 1998. A early as October 1998 we had flown eight upgraded F-16s from Leeuwarden to Amendola, Italy as reinforcements to the Dutch F-16s already there. Then the negotiations were able to come to an agreement with Milosevic, but not this time. When we heard that we were going to fly, we started making preparations by establishing which countries and aircraft would be taking part int the attack formation, checking arrangements for getting everyone to the destination, which means working out, routes and altitudes, and, of course what kind of support there would be from tanker aircraft. The preparations were no different from those for a normal practice flight. During exercises such as Red Flag it's just the same.
We knew one day before the mission, that we had been assigned to the second attack formation of the second NATO formation. A package like this consists of different kinds of aircraft. Apart from the aircraft whose mission was to deliver the bombs, there were air defence fighters, suppression of enemy air defence fighters, and other support aircraft at a distance, such as flying radar stations, command aircraft and tankers. Our task was to fly ahead of the attack formation in our four modernized Midlife Update F-16s to look out for enemy aircraft that might attack the formation. This is called a fighter sweep, and it means that you are the first aircraft to enter enemy territory...!
That day I went to the air base at about 14:00. I worked through the whole preparation cycle discussing the situation with intelligence and the Met (meterology) people, discussing the mission with the three other pilots, getting equipment issued and lastly, handing in my personal possessions. When you talk about the mission you discuss things like the kind of formation the four of you are going to fly in, and what rules of engagement are - that is when force should be used and when not.
At 17:45 I went to my assigned aircraft J-063, equipped with four AIM-120B AMRAAMs, two fuel tanks and an ALQ-131 jamming pod, aside from the built-in 20mm gun.
The fact that this was a real mission did not change anything. Even the idea that we were going to be flying in the dark was not unusual. We practise night flying regurarly, and we often flew at night during the operations we had been carrying out for years over Bosnia.
After taking off at 20:45, we flew to the rendezvous with a tanker above the Adriatic Sea. I was number three in the formation. First there was the lead, that is, our formation leader, with his wingman, then me with my wingman. After fueling up we flew to the marshaling area. In the meantime it had become pitch dark. We knew that some 20 or 30 of our mates were flying in the area, but we could not see them. We also heard that the first formation to carry out an attack during Allied Force had returned safely from Yugoslavia.
We set course for Kosovo at the predetermined time, everyone in his place in the formation at the altitude assigned. The moment we crossed the Yugoslav border we heard from Magic, NATO's AWACS aircraft that three MiGs of the Yugoslav Air Force were in the air. That was all we heard for a while. A few minutes later the lead of our group of four saw a MiG on his radar. The radar contact put it more or less on our flight path and we were directed to it by the AWACS.
I had no radar contact flying some 6 miles (10km) behind the lead pair, but with the F-16MLU's improved datalink capability, leader datalinked his picture so that I could see where the target was. We still did not know what kind of target it was but because of its high speed (400 knots) we knew it was fast. Asked the AWACS permission to engage but the AWACS crew could not see it as it was flying at 5,000ft (1,500m) behind a ridge.
Through a range of other planes and assets, the AWACS tried to identify the nature of the contact and finally it was agreed that it was hostile. However, only one target was visible and the AWACS personnel understood that there should be three - they did not know that the other two had already been shot down by a pair of USAF F-15Cs of the 493rd FS flying from Cervia AB in Italy.
Suddenly the contact disappeared from the radar. Following our rules the leader banked off, followed by his wingman. We were also going to bank off when I saw the target again on my radar. My wingman and I were directed to it. In such a short time, say 4 to 5 minutes, you are regurarly in contact with the AWACS aircraft. In our formation we had not exchanged a word with each other, everything we had to know about each other's movements was transmitted by the datalinks aboard the MLU F-16s. Eventually I got the order from the AWACS to intercept the target.
At 20:30.08 at a distance of 11 miles (18km) flying at an altitude of 34,000ft (10,363m) I fired one AMRAAM from the port underwing station. After you press the firing button you actually have to wait for about a second before the missile leaves. That time seemed to last forever. I rememberred that I looked at my wing to see whether the missile had become stuck. But as I watched, the rocket motor fired - the fierce light blinding me a little.
After about five seconds I lost the missile in the pitch black sky as its engine had spent its fuel and burnt out. Approximately ten seconds from impact the missile acquired the MiG with its own radar, allowing me to turn away sharply. I knew where the target was flying and looked in that direction over my left shoulder. I saw a dim flash of light and a second or so after that, burning pieces of wreckage falling. Than I knew I had hit him.
Until the impact I had not thought at all that the four of us were actually carrying out a 'real' interception. I was just too busy looking at the instruments, talking to the AWACS, and of course flying the aircraft. Moreover, the other aircraft of the NATO formation were at that time also carrying on with their mission, and quite a lot of bombs and missiles were being fired at the enemy air defenses. When I saw that my missile had hit the target I was very pleased. An aircraft like that is always a threat at such a time, and if your missile misses, for whatever reason, you are going to have to do something about it - either attack again, or begin evasive manoeuvers. But in my case it was unnecessary.
The MiG-29 came down west of Kusevac. The kill was immediately confirmed by the fighter controller in the AWACS who had seen his radar contact disappear. The engagement took approximately five minutes. I later learned that the pilot had escaped using his ejection seat.
We had to patrol above that area for another 20 minutes, and in that time, plenty of SAMs were fired at the NATO formation. We were flying quite high and could see that three SAMs were fired at our F-16s. It is very strange to see the warning in the cockpit and then the missile itself, coming at you like a fiery arrow. Then you really have to do something, like evasive manoeuvers and throwing out chaff. It was our job as fighter sweep to stay in the area until the last aircraft of the attack formation had left - first in, last out. After the last one had left, we took the shortest route back to Amendola. In total, the flight lasted two and a half hours.
When we landed at Amendola, they already knew we had brought down a jet but they just did not know which one of the four of us had fired the missile. When you land you have to put your weapons on safe mode at the end of the runway before you are allowed to taxi the aircraft to the platform. This is done by weapons personnel which is to say the same people who had earlier mounted the missiles under the aircraft. When they saw that I had fired one they got quite excited. The fact that a missile had been fired meant they had done their job well. If they had not, I could have squeezed the firing button as much as I liked without anything happening. So it was only right they were pleased that everything worked as well as it was supposed to.
In Amendola they asked if I wanted to phone my wife. I said that I never phoned my wife at 00:30, so why should I start now? They told me that she had phoned from Leeuwarden already and that she expected a call, so I telephoned her right away.
I flew eleven missions above and around Yugoslavia, including air defence assignments and attack missions, until the Leeuwarden detachment was releved.
Looking back at that first night, I still does not experience feelings of triumph. That night, the four of us did what we are paid to do, a fighter sweep to make sure that the attack formation could do its work safely. No more, no less. Its satisfying to know that we carried out all the tasks assigned to us as required, but then I am talking about the deployment of the Dutch F-16s as a whole, not just about that one night. That means that you have been well trained and that your equipment works.
Take the F-16... during that first mission we used all the advantages of the latest Midlife Update version. The improved radar enabled us to see the MiG earlier, and with the help of our new IFF we knew quickly that it was an enemy aircraft. Using AMRAAM missile, we were able to put aircraft out of action from a considerable distance. Also we did not have to talk to each other during the entire air combat phase because we could exchange information by means of datalink.
In short, these were all things that increased our chances of being able to make an effective contribution. I thought it interesting that we were assigned the fighter sweep function in the formation because we had the MLU version. With standard F-16 you have fewer options, and we would not have been given that assignment.
In fact, the Dutch F-16AMs were the only non-American fighters that were flying escort missions in enemy territory, a clear indication that the Americans, who effectively ran the show despite it being under NATO banner, were confident about the Dutch equipment and training standards.
This was the climax of an historical mission for the Royal Netherlands Air Force. It marked the first air-to-air kill for the service since World War Two and put the RNLAF in the modern air combat spotlight. But more importantly it was the ultimate reward for a progressive and professional organisation that had put a lot of effort into modernizing its equipment and maintaining an extremely high level of training in the turbulent 1990s.
Maj Predrag Milutinovicwas launched from Ponikve in MiG-29 number 18106. His RWR alerted him 3Km from Kosovo. He took evasive action to break lock. Over Ribarska Banja RWR alerted him again and 10s after, he was hit. Successfully ejected.
Lt Col Michael “Dog” Geczy (USAF) 78th EFS “Bushmasters,” F-16CJ Operation ALLIED FORCE MiG-29 4 May 1999 Call-sign: PUMA 11
Lt Col Geczy graduated from Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT) at Sheppard AFB in 1983. Upon completing F-4E training in 1984 he flew the Phantom II for two years, converting to the F-16C in 1986 while on his first operational assignment at Ramstein AB, Germany. He later graduated from the USAF Fighter Weapons School F-16 Division in 1992. Lt Col Geczy had approximately 2,300 flight hours (including previous combat experience in Iraq and Bosnia) in the F-16C (Blocks 15, 30, 42, and 50) before deploying to Aviano AB for Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF). This MiG-29 kill occurred on his 115th career combat mission, and his seventh mission supporting OAF. The following excerpts were taken from a briefing that Lt Col Geczy gave about a year following the event.
We were tasked for what we call a "force protection" mission... loaded up with two High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs), two AIM-120A AMRAAMs, two AIM-9M Sidewinders, a full load of 20mm, and self protection assets (external jamming pod on the centerline, chaff and flares, and towed decoys). As there were no Eagles tasked as part of this daylight strike mission, our job was to protect the strikers from both the surface and air threats.
The jets were Block 50 F-16CJs. F-16CJs are configured with the HARM Targeting System pod on the side of the intake. The HARMs are those large white missiles closest to the external fuel tanks that home in on radar emissions from SAMs, AAA, or early warning radars. The other key part to our force protection mission was air-to-air, of course. On the wingtip missile stations are the AIM-120 AMRAAMs; we also carried the shorter range AIM-9M infrared missiles on the inboard stations, and the trusty internal, 20 mm Gatling gun for shorter range air-to-air engagements.
My flight included myself as number one (on my 12th contingency deployment), my wingman, who was a 1 Lt (“DBAL" Austin, with about 350 hours in the jet) on his third contingency deployment; the number three and element lead (“Hajii” Julazadeh) was an instructor pilot with about 1,200 hours (and on his eighth contingency deployment). The number four man, “Nut” Peterson, was absolutely critical to our success that day. Although “Nut” was flying as a wingman and number four, he was then a four-ship flight lead, and upgrading to instructor pilot with about 800 hours in the F-16. Operation ALLIED FORCE was “Nut’s” second contingency deployment. This combat sortie was the seventh or eighth Operation ALLIED FORCE sortie for all of us, since Shaw AFB deployed our squadron into the theater about three weeks into the war as part of a NATO force structure plus-up.
I have to admit, my opinion is that the Serbian surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery crews were pretty darn good...well trained and coordinated during Operation ALLIED FORCE, and with some pretty creative and unpredictable tactics. They fired over 700 SAMs at NATO aircraft during the war! Of course, the Serbian military had been watching NATO’s operations over Bosnia for more than six years, and had been quick to modify their tactics during this operation to increase the probability of a successful kill against NATO aircraft. So frankly, since the Serbian MiG-29s had not faced NATO pilots for almost seven weeks at this point of the war — and we had just lost our second NATO jet a couple nights prior to a SAM — my biggest concern that day was the SAM operators. I was dead wrong, as the biggest threat that day would end up being one MiG-29 driver who would attempt to intercept “tail-end Charlie" during the egress phase of the strike.
On that day, NATO was conducting some of its first daylight strikes in central Serbia, near Belgrade. There were two flights of four f-16CJs, each dedicated to the force protection of these midday strikes. My flight, call-sign PUMA 11, was tasked to launch out of Aviano, pre-strike refuel, enter Serbia, protect Strike "Alpha,” egress, refuel again, re-enter Serbia again, and then protect Strike "Charlie.” Strike package “Alpha" that day included Dutch, British, and French strikers. Another flight of four F-16CJs (PANTHER 21) were from Spangdahlem AB (but also launched out of Aviano), and were protecting strikes “Bravo” and "Delta” in the same manner.
Keep in mind that, since the F-l5Cs were dedicated to protecting the tankers and AWACS that day, they only had CAPs up in Bosnia and Hungary. The other players that day included EA-6Bs, a French AWACS that controlled all of the activity in Bosnia, and a British AWACS that controlled the strikes in Serbia.
Let's get on to the details of that day. First of all, the weather was poor. The clouds were layered to broken up to almost 30,000 feet. Our flight had some difficulty finding good, clear airspace to CAP to do the best job protecting against the air and surface threats during the strike period. In fact, the British and Dutch strikers ended up weather aborting their attacks completely. On the other hand, the French strikers, or KNIFE 61, were working overtime trying to deliver their bombs between holes in the weather in their target area.
Near the end of the strike period, KNIFE 61's flight lead requested that we stay on station another eight minutes or so until they finished their attacks. I agreed, but of course, was concerned that we might end up stretching the flight's fuel before we could get back to the tanker. Since my fuel state was actually the lowest in the flight, I made a mental planning note that I was the most “skosh” on gas.
Later, I heard the next set of F-16CJs for Strike Bravo, PANTHER 21, check in on the strike frequency. Well, the French finished their attacks after about 12 minutes of "overtime," and we started to escort them out of Serbia. Keep in mind, it had been a very quiet mission up to this point. Although we had done some preemptive SAM targeting, we had not fired any HARMs at active sites during this first strike period. I was probably a bit too casual finishing up this "walk in the park" strike package, and too anxious to get air refueled and back on station for the next one.
It is near the end of this “ho-hum” egress that the AWACS controller calls out that a "bogey" is airborne in Serbia. I completely missed this call! Fortunately, our trusty number four man, "Nut," saved the day, and piped up on our discrete, intra-flight frequency with a "head's up" call and the bogey's position. We immediately turned the four F-16s around, and we faced the bogey in a wall formation. During our turn to face down track, NATO AWACS called out the track as hostile for the first of what would be a total of seven times during the intercept.
We simultaneously pushed it up to supersonic, climbed up into the high 30s (forgot to jettison our tanks!), and pressed right on into the SAM threat rings. Shortly thereafter, “DBAL" called out that he was bingo fuel...since I knew that I actually had the lowest fuel in the flight, I "copied" his call, and decided that all of us would most likely need to recover into Sarajevo after the engagement.
About this same time, the AWACS controller made some calls that made the NATO-required beyond-visual-range (BVR) rules of engagement (ROE) matrix damned confusing, and uncertain in my mind. As I was working through this dilemma, both in my head and with some calls back to AWACS, I tried to get PANTHER 21 flight’s radars looking for the target (who were actually trailing us by quite a bit). I frankly started to have my doubts that we were going to finish this intercept with the little fuel remaining. Also during this final period of the intercept, the MiG-29 driver illuminated me with his radar a couple times, which definitely got my attention.
Fortunately, yet uncomfortably late in the intercept, and at range much less than we all wanted. I finally worked through all the ROE rules with AWACS... I got a chance to put my thumb on the weapons release, or pickle button—one of my last thoughts as I was mashing down on the pickle button was, “if it’s important enough to shoot, shoot two. So, ‘Dog,’ fire these two off as rapidly as possible!"
Well, it seemed to take FOREVER for that first missile to come off—must have been time compression! I actually had second thoughts about whether I had properly armed-up or not. I just started to glance in the HUD to confirm the arm status, and then I saw the first missile come off from the left wingtip. I mashed the second AMRAAM off as quickly as I could after that first one launched. It didn't seem to take nearly as long for the second AMRAAM to blast off the right wingtip!
Although I had already fired an AIM-9 in training and HARMs in Bosnia during Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, and earlier in Operation ALLIED FORCE, I had not YET had a firsthand appreciation for what an AMRAAM live-fire looked like. Those two AMRAAM launches were EXTREMELY impressive, and continue to amaze me even today!
Since the MiG was at short range and maneuvering at this point, the line-of-sight of the target was changing rapidly across my nose and well below me—those missile fins obviously dug-in immediately after launch and dove with rapid, arcing attacks through the HUD field-of-view with breakneck speed (kind of like a pitcher throwing a curve ball)! It was a true testament to American technology that the AMRAAM performed so well at close range, and with a fantastically high line-of-sight! I am not sure any other radar missile out there could have hacked the square-corner that the AMRAAMs made that day!
Descending quite a bit after the launches, I noted on my radar that the missiles were preparing to impact, and made a mental note that in order to get credit for the kill, “I had better see this, as I may be the only one who witnesses it!” I rolled up in about 90 degrees of left bank, and then saw the aircraft exploding about six thousand feet below, and between scattered cloud layers (basically underneath my left knee). I made two, “Splash one with a fireball!” radio calls to AWACS—guess I knew that my chances of making that call again in my flying career were essentially nil!
“DBAL,” on the other hand, reported after the mission that he watched both missiles all the way into impact. Fortunately, the weather had scattered out somewhat at the point of intercept, so today "DBAL" has a "nanosecond by nanosecond" recollection of how the aircraft defensively maneuvered to a near perfect beam, the missiles' impacts, how the MiG started to burn, and what parts came off first!
Following the engagement, as we were all “skosh" on fuel, we immediately started our climb and egress to the west, towards the tanker tracks in Bosnia. I requested that the AWACS controller sector our tanker due east and directly back to us.
Now the real difficult part of the mission began! As it turned out, and as was frequently true during Operation ALLIED FORCE, the hairiest part of the mission was just beginning: getting rejoined on a tanker that has been directed to retrograde to a safer area, in the weather, while other F-16 and F-15 flights are rejoining on it simultaneously to do their refueling, in the weather. When we crossed into Bosnia, we discovered that our tanker was over 120 miles away and going further away!
I then set a divert bingo for the flight for Sarajevo, and had to call the tanker crew directly to get them to turn around for an in-the-weather tanker rejoin. In the end, we were able to refuel and get back on station for Strike Charlie. Shortly thereafter Strike Charlie was weather cancelled. With a full load of fuel, we flew back to Aviano “as the crow flies” — supersonic in the low 40s across the whole length of Bosnia, and across the Adriatic Sea — breaking all kinds of rules, I am sure!
It was raining like cats and dogs when we finally got back to Aviano; of course, I insisted upon bringing the four-ship up a combat, tactical initial after the mission (pretty dumb decision, as the rain storm was almost directly over the air base) — the guys did a marvelous job getting the jets on the deck, despite my stupid act!
We all lined up in the de-arm area, and a crew chief hooked up on the head-set communications cord during the aircraft de-arming. Since my HARMs were still loaded. I guess he thought that we had a “ho-hum" mission; he asked me in a real low key voice, and obviously not really pleased to be in the pouring rain.
“Well, Sir, how did your mission go?"
I replied, “Pretty good...Shot a MiG down."
He yelled back, “You got to be sh!ting me...Sir!”
I yelled back at him, “Look at the missile rails!!!”
I looked at the rails too, at that point, and saw the other guys in the de-arm crew doing pull-ups on the missile rails in the rain! They were really psyched up, and came up later after shutdown to give me the AMRAAM umbilical cables that remained—perfect mementos for that mission!
“Nut” showed exemplary flight discipline that day. First, by succinctly and promptly advising the flight about the AWACS call that a “bogey” was approaching during our egress. And second, by employing his radar as directed to confirm that no other threats were airborne. Also, unlike other “yahoo-cowboy radio calls" that you hear sometimes during MiG kills these days, my flight members did not say ONE word after the MiG-29 was splashed. They maintained the strictest discipline throughout the egress, on to the next AWACS controller in Bosnia, to the tanker, and on the boom taking fuel. Only after the air refueling was complete, and when we were preparing to return for the next strike period, did “Nut” say on the discrete frequency
“PUMA 1, PUMA 4. request?”
“Go ahead with your request, PUMA 4”
“Sir, can we go back there and do that again?”
By the way, last month "Nut" Peterson was selected to go to F-16 Fighter Weapons School for the class starting this summer.
There were some internet claims immediately after the war that this MiG-29 was mistakenly shot down by a Serbian SAM battery. That is absolute, complete, and pure BS! You can actually see the aircraft break up on my radar tape after the missile’s impact!
I cannot speculate upon the Serbian Air Force single ship tactics that day, or why someone would make such a claim, other than to perhaps save face for the Serbian MiG-29s that performed so poorly during the war against NATO pilots (for lots of reasons, I am sure: weak equipment, poor aircraft serviceability, lousy Soviet-style training and flying currency, etc). Lately, more and more of the Serbian internet sites acknowledge that this MiG-29 was downed by an F-16CJ.
But what I can say is that the four of us that day were employing fully mission capable F-16CJs with 100% of our jets and avionics operational (thanks to our maintenance technicians), fully armed with a variety of operational weapons ready to handle all kinds of threats (thanks to our munitions, armament, and weapons technicians), and were fully trained to handle the events of that day (thanks to the USAF training and readiness model).
You bet, there are decisions and tactics that I would do differently if I had a chance to do that mission again. But any of my flight members could have ended up firing those two AMRAAMs and getting a MiG-29 kill that day. I was fortunate to have been the leader and targeted the group, and thankfully supported by a great flight of Viper drivers, particularly “Nut” Peterson, who really got the “light bulb turned on” during our egress.
Although Lt Col Geczy deployed to Operation ALLIED FORCE as part of the 78th Fighter Squadron, the deployment included jets from other squadrons at Shaw AFB. The aircraft during Lt Col Geczy’s MiG-29 engagement (91-0353) was actually from the 77th FS “Gamblers.” Lt Col Geczy went on to command the 77th Fighter Squadron, and made F-16 91-0353 the squadron flagship during his two year command.
MiG-29 number 18109 was launched from Batajnica, Lt Col Milenko Pavlovic jet was hit by AMRAAM and crashed at Petnica.
