WASHINGTON POST: SOK MAGYAR ELITELI TRIANONT MINT TORTENELMILEG IGAZSAGTALAN
Nationalism, Out. Normalcy, In. That's the Real Balkan Story - Washington
Post
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2 millio magyar el a hatarokon kivul, de nem fontos tenyezok a
belpolitikaban. TRIANON felelos Magyarorszag jelenlegi stabilitasaert es
felviragzasaert mivel etnikailag tiszta orszagot eredmenyezett. Ma mar a
magyarok hozzaszoktak a birodalom elvesztesehez Trianonban. Az orszag
bekeben van magaval es szomszedaival
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MEGJEGYZES: Hogyan lett Antall Jozsef ota az 5 milliobol 2 millio? Pest
anti-patria urainak a muve, kik nem hozzak a vilag nyilvanossagara a magyar
nep ujra egyesitesenek szuksegesseget, az erdelyi magyarok brutalis
elnyomasat! Csak Erdelyben 2.6 millio magyar van, s ha nepszavazast
rendeznenk, ez meg meg is duzzadna! Felvidek 800,000! Vajdasag 400,000!
Karpatalja 250,000! A beke illuzio! Addig nem lesz igazi beke amig
igazsagos etnikumi eloszlason alapulo hatarok (adminisztrativ vonalak az
EU-ban) nem lesznek. A magyar nepnek joga van a bekes egyesitesre NATO
vedelem alatt ugyanugy mint a nemet nepnek volt. Az sajnos igaz, hogy Pest
anti-patria urai sikeresen elnyomjak a HK-i magyarok ugyet a magyar
politikai porondon.
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FELHIVAS: Nemzettarsak! Az 56-os forradalom 44. evforduloja jo alkalom arra,
hogy TOTAL KAMPANYt inditsunk az MSZP, SZDSZ, RMDSZ, es VMSZ kommunistainak
vegleges kiszoritasara a politikai eletbol. A tortenelem mar a szemet dombra
jutatta a kommunizmust, de a volt kommunistak tovabbra is NEMZET-ELLENES
politikat folytatnak a demokracia egisze alatt! Az MSZP/SZDSZ kommunistai
meg csak nem is kertek bocsanatot 3 ezer pesti forradalmar lany es srac
kivegzeseert (az 56-os tablo kor kozepen lathato forradalmar lany ki lett
vegezve), sok ezer magyar forradalmar torvenytelen bebortonzeseert. Miert
engedjuk meg az o mukodesuket mely a haborus bunosok fogalma ala esik? Az
RMDSZ kommunistai tovabb folytatjak NEMZET-ARULO munkajukat mely akadalyozza
Erdely magyar-lakta teruleteinek bekes egyesiteset az anyaorszaggal.
Ugyanez a Vajdasagra es a Felvidekre. Budapest persze orul ennek, mert igy
nem kell a TRIANON nehez problemajaval foglalkozni. Az ORBAN-TORGYAN kormany
sajnos rendkivul gyenge format mutat a magyar nep bekes egyesitese ugyeben,
szinte letagadja a vilag elott a magyarok brutalis elnyomasat a TRIANON-i
hatarokon kivul, kulonosen Erdelyben a magyar kultura bolcsojeben.
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56-os
Millenium 2000 tablo
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Hungary offers an obvious political lesson for Serbia. After the
Austro-Hungarian Empire broke up as a result of World War I, Hungary was
forced to give up two-thirds of its territory under the 1920 Treaty of
Trianon. Today, Hungarians have largely come to terms with the loss of
empire. Instead, they have a compact, ethnically homogeneous country at
peace with itself and its neighbors. Denounced by many Hungarians as
historically unjust, the treaty laid the basis for their country's present
stability. An estimated 2 million ethnic Hungarians still live in
neighboring Romania, Slovakia and the Vojvodina region of Serbia, but are
not a major factor in internal Hungarian politics.
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By Michael Dobbs
Sunday, October 15, 2000; Page B01
A decade ago, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a wave of
self-congratulation swept through Western capitals. With communism seemingly
vanquished, there was boastful talk about the "end of history" and the
triumph of American free-market ideology. The triumphalism turned out to be
sadly misplaced, in part because Western policymakers failed to come to
grips with a perverse political phenomenon: communists transforming
themselves into nationalists.
Today, with the fall of the archetypal communist-turned-nationalist,
Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic, the West has a second chance to make good on
promises of creating a Europe that is "whole and free." While Europe's agony
is far from over--the Balkans, in particular, resemble an economic disaster
zone--an important page in post-Cold War history has been turned.
Nationalism is no longer the politically mobilizing force it once was.
The past two years have seen sweeping political changes in the Balkans and
neighboring regions, including the demise of nationalist leaders in
Slovakia, Croatia, Bosnia and now Serbia. The man who was at once
Milosevic's nemesis and mirror image, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman,
died in December 1999. A month later, his nationalist Croatian Democratic
Union suffered a crushing election defeat at the hands of pragmatic
pro-Western politicians, opening the way for Croatia's reintegration with
Europe--and providing a psychological boost to democracy advocates in
Serbia.
Built up by their own propaganda organs as defenders of ethnic rights and
national sovereignty, the Balkan strongmen turned out to be false messiahs.
In June 1989, during his early days in power, Milosevic stood in front of a
million wildly cheering Serbs and promised them prosperity, national dignity
and the respect of other European countries. What he actually delivered was
penury, international isolation and a flood of refugees fleeing from
Serb-occupied lands in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo after a succession of
disastrous wars.
The defeat of Milosevic and the other nationalist leaders is not so much a
triumph for Western ideology as it is a triumph for non-ideology. During the
recent election campaign, the slogan that had the most resonance with
Serbian voters was "We need a normal life in a normal country." It was
coined by Vojislav Kostunica, the Democratic opposition leader who was sworn
in eight days ago as president of rump Yugoslavia. (Once made up of six
republics, Yugoslavia now consists of just Serbia and tiny Montenegro.)
A rumpled intellectual, Kostunica has sometimes been termed a moderate
nationalist, a reputation that derives in part from his earlier support for
the Bosnian Serb cause. What he really is, according to veteran Serb
journalist Stojan Cerovic, now a visiting fellow at the U.S. Institute of
Peace, is "a conservative, decent person" who wants to restore his nation's
self-respect. "Serbs realize that it is not up to them to make history any
longer," he says. "They feel despised and humiliated by everybody. That is
the meaning of Kostunica's nationalism--a desire to heal the wounds."
It can be difficult for people who live in an affluent, stable society to
understand the revolutionary appeal of normality. Kostunica's slogan was
reminiscent of a phrase used by Mikhail Gorbachev shortly before he became
Soviet leader in 1985--"We can't go on living like this"--which foreshadowed
the collapse of Soviet communism. Underlying both slogans was a sense that
years of ideological indoctrination combined with strained relations with
the outside world had resulted only in economic ruin. Both communism and
nationalism proved to be dead ends, unable to deliver on promises of a
decent life for ordinary people.
As Milosevic and his supporters realized the scale of their defeat, their
attempts to exploit Serbian nationalist sentiment became ever more frenetic.
In one speech, Milosevic described his political opponents as "NATO lackeys"
and warned that a Kostunica victory could result in the "extermination" of
the Serbian nation. His associates were still at it last week, with Defense
Minister Dragolub Ojdanic warning of a foreign "occupation" of Serbia. But
such rhetoric no longer has the power to sway Serb public opinion; it now
seems more comic than anything else.
The desire for normality has a particular resonance for Yugoslavs because,
under the leadership of Tito, they viewed their country as the most "normal"
of communist states, almost a part of the West. Unlike other communist
countries, Tito's Yugoslavia did not owe allegiance to the Soviet Union.
Yugoslavs were free to travel abroad and, compared with their neighbors in
Hungary and Bulgaria, were relatively well off. Although he kept a tight
rein on political dissent, Tito and his successors permitted a degree of
economic freedom.
Today, that situation has been reversed. During the decade since the
collapse of communism, Hungary in particular has become a model of political
stability and prosperity. It is already a NATO member and is on the way to
joining the European Union. Yugoslavs now travel to Hungary the way
Hungarians once traveled to Yugoslavia, with their eyes popping out of their
heads.
Hungary offers an obvious political lesson for Serbia. After the
Austro-Hungarian Empire broke up as a result of World War I, Hungary was
forced to give up two-thirds of its territory under the 1920 Treaty of
Trianon. Today, Hungarians have largely come to terms with the loss of
empire. Instead, they have a compact, ethnically homogeneous country at
peace with itself and its neighbors. Denounced by many Hungarians as
historically unjust, the treaty laid the basis for their country's present
stability. An estimated 2 million ethnic Hungarians still live in
neighboring Romania, Slovakia and the Vojvodina region of Serbia, but are
not a major factor in internal Hungarian politics.
Under wise leadership, and with the right kind of incentives from the United
States and Western Europe, the same could one day be true of Serbia. There
will continue to be a large Serbian diaspora in Bosnia, Macedonia and
Croatia. But Serbian politicians will no longer dream of a "Greater Serbia"
or talk, as Milosevic did, about the right of all Serbs "to live in one
state."
With Serb and Croat nationalism in obvious decline, the most dangerous
nationalism haunting the Balkans today is probably Albanian. For the moment,
the drive for a Greater Albania is being kept in check by the NATO
occupation of Kosovo. But many Albanian politicians, particularly those
associated with the Kosovo Liberation Army, make little secret of their
long-term desire to unite all Albanian-inhabited territories, including
Kosovo, large chunks of Macedonia and Montenegro, and Albania proper. Sooner
or later, Western leaders will have to grapple with these unfulfilled
Albanian aspirations.
For Western policymakers, the most important lesson of the tumultuous events
in the Balkans over the past decade is that inattention and disengagement
can lead to disaster. Like his predecessor George Bush, President Clinton
did his best to steer clear of Balkan entanglements, only to find America
being dragged in, almost against his will. Since the conclusion in late 1995
of the Dayton accords, which ended the fighting in Bosnia, more than 250,000
U.S. military personnel have rotated through Bosnia and Kosovo. Americans
seem destined to be present in the Balkans for a long time to come.
Supporters of U.S. intervention in the Balkans are pointing to Milosevic's
fall as a vindication of their policies. "Western intervention put a halt to
what [Serbian] nationalism was able to achieve in Bosnia and Kosovo," said
Ivo Daalder, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, who previously served as
the Balkan expert at the National Security Council. "We turned the corner
with Milosevic at the end of 1998 when we decided that he was part of the
problem rather than the solution."
Whether or not American policies hastened Milosevic's ultimate demise--he
remained in power for 13 years--is debatable. Many Serbs, including
Kostunica, argue that American-led economic sanctions against Serbia
strengthened Milosevic's domestic political position, as they provided him
with a perfect alibi for a disastrous economic situation. The West became a
convenient scapegoat for problems caused in large measure by the corruption
and mismanagement of Milosevic and his cronies.
What is true, however, is that the almost simultaneous collapse of
nationalist regimes in Serbia and Croatia, together with last year's victory
in Kosovo, present the West with a huge geopolitical opportunity. There is a
parallel here with America's involvement in Western Europe after World War
II. Thanks in large measure to the American security umbrella, France and
Germany were able to rise above centuries of animosity and work
together--first for economic reconstruction, then for European integration.
Given sufficient economic and political incentives, and a long-term NATO
security presence, there seems to be no reason why the model of
Franco-German reconciliation should not be replicated in the Balkans. If the
French and the Germans can overcome what in the Balkan context have been
termed "deep-seated ethnic hatreds," why not Serbs, Croats and even
Albanians?
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